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ABSTRACT 
Terrorism and the State 
by Kai A. Konrad* 
This paper considers terrorism as an extortion activity. It uses tools from the theory of 
extortion and from conflict theory to describe how terrorism works, why terrorism is a 
persistent phenomenon, why terrorism is a violent phenomenon, and how retaliation 
affects the outcome. The analysis highlights the importance of information aspects and 
discusses some aspects of the organizational design. 
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JEL classification : C72, D72, D74 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Terrorismus und der Staat  
Anhand der frühen terroristischen Organisation der Ismaili aus dem 11. bis 13. Jahr-
hundert wird deutlich, dass zwischen Schutzgelderpressung und Terrorismus keine klare 
Trennlinie existiert. Die Ismaili waren zeitweise als Staat organisiert, teilweise eine 
Organisation ohne eigenes Territorium. Sie nutzten die gleichen Instrumente zur 
Durchsetzung politischer, religiöser und rein finanzieller Ziele. Diese strukturelle 
Äquivalenz wird genutzt, um einige Ergebnisse aus der Theorie der Schutz-
gelderpressung für das Verständnis der Funktionsweise von Terrorismus abzuleiten. Die 
formale Analyse konzentriert sich dabei auf ein fundamentales Informations- und 
Glaubwürdigkeitsproblem, das anhand der Berichte über die Ismaili deutlich wird. 
Dieses Informationsproblem kann erklären, weshalb Terrorismus ein mehrperiodisches 
Phänomen ist, warum Terrorismus mit Gewalt einhergeht, weshalb Terroristen eine 
öffentliche Sichtbarkeit ihrer Anschläge bevorzugen und wie Gegenschläge und Ver-
suche der Zerschlagung einer terroristischen Organisation in diesem Zusammenhang zu 
bewerten sind. Kurz werden weitere Aspekte diskutiert, die für das Verständnis von 
Terrorismus wichtig sind, in der formalen Analyse aber ausgeblendet werden. 
                                                 
*  I thank Helmut Bester, Frank Cowell, Amihai Glazer, Mats Lundahl and Stergios Skaperdas and the 
participants in presentations in Berlin and Venice for comments and suggestions. The usual caveat 
applies. 
1 Introduction
An increase in the frequency and the scale of terrorism1 in the US and Israel,
rumors about further attacks in other Western countries, the attempt to
retaliate in Afghanistan, and various changes in privacy laws and restrictions
on human rights have recently generated much interest in terrorism in the
various branches of social sciences. However, terrorism is an old, even ancient
phenomenon, going back more than a thousand years, and the scienti…c study
of terrorism is also not new.
I will de…ne terrorism with the words of Thomas Schelling (1984, 315) who
writes “My dictionary de…nes terrorism as ‘the use of terror, violence, and
intimidation to achieve an end’. And to terrorize is ‘to coerce by intimidation
to achieve an end’.” I will focus on an interest group exerting violence and
intimidation vis-a-vis single states and I will not be more speci…c as regards
the ends, except that the state can grant them at some cost.
Drawing on reports about the Ismaili (also called Assassins), an ancient,
and extremely successful terrorist organization that was active in the Middle
East for about two hundred years during the Crusades, I will show that,
in structural terms, terrorism resembles an extortion activity. The history
of the Ismaili will reveal that no clear dividing line can be drawn between
ordinary extortionary threats of violence used by well-organized groups such
as the Ma…a, bandits, or robber barons, and ethnic or religious groups that
commit terrorist acts, with respect to both the extortion mechanism applied,
and the ends pursued by these groups.
I will therefore use earlier results on extortion to describe terrorism in
economic terms. The analysis highlights problems of observability, credibil-
ity, and commitment on the side of both the terrorist group and the state
that may consider retaliating. These problems explain a number of styl-
ized facts about terrorism. First, terrorism is violent. Second, terrorism is
a persistent phenomenon in which threats, terrorist attacks, and retaliation
occur repeatedly. Third, terrorist groups may dissolve after a massive strike
against them, may disappear for some time and re-appear, or dissolve after
achieving many of their goals. Fourth, the terrorist group bene…ts from a
successful attack, particularly if there is no retaliation. Given these insights,
one can then ask the policy question of how terrorism can be fought. Once
1The quantitative importance of terrorism is di¢cult to assess, but it is clearly an
empirically relevant phenomenon. For instance, the homepage of the International Pol-
icy Institute of Counter-Terrorism (http://www.ict.org.il/inter_ter/frame.htm) provides
a data set that counts 1173 terrorist incidents world wide between 1988 and spring 2002,
and 868 with at least one person killed. Among these, the more frequent types of attacks
were bombings (298 of the total), kidnappings (154), and shootings (354).
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again, drawing on the literature on extortion will be useful.
Although this is not a survey of terrorism research, some main sources of
references should be mentioned here. A most comprehensive survey on terror-
ism research is by Enders and Sandler (1995) who look at both empirical and
theoretical work on terrorism. Henderson (2001) provides an interesting ref-
erence guide. The main issues in the empirical work are which macro factors
can explain terrorist attacks (Enders and Sandler 2000, Sandler and Enders
2002, O’Brien 1996), the role and e¤ectiveness of prevention measures, and
the economic consequences of terrorism, e.g., for tourism (Enders and Sandler
1996, Enders, Sandler and Parise 1992, Abadie and Gardeazabal 2001). Some
theoretical aspects are related to issues such as the terrorists’ target selection
problem, free riding strategies of countries in an international environment
(Lee 1988), negotiations with terrorists (Lapan and Sandler 1988), or the ter-
rorist’s choice problem of whether to become a hijacker (Landes 1978). The
analyses that are most closely related to the ideas about extortion are those
of Scott (1989, 1991), who considers terrorists who are uninformed about the
type of government they try to threaten, and Lapan and Sandler (1993), who
consider terrorists who have private information about their total stock of
arms and use part of this in a …rst attack, and for signalling their strength.
Since they consider a signaling game, they are faced with a major equilibrium
selection problem.
In the extortion game considered here, no signaling occurs. A crucial
di¤erence to standard credibility problems with type uncertainty is that the
terrorist group’s type is endogenous and is chosen by the group. Although,
with exogenous types, state intelligence that uncovers the terrorist group’s
type is useful, such intelligence can also be harmful, and lead to an equilib-
rium with terrorism which would not exist without this intelligence.
In the next section (section 2) I will brie‡y review aspects of one of the
perhaps most successful terrorist groups in human history which illustrate
the structural equivalence and similarity between terrorism and extortion.
In section 3 I will consider the simple extortion game and will show why
problems of observability of endogenously chosen types cause violence and
why terrorism and extortion work only in repeated relationships. The aim is
a better understanding of the actual interplay between a terrorist group and
a state as two players, one of which extorts the other. Section 4 considers
the more general in…nite horizon case. Section 5 discusses the aspect of
retaliation. Section 6 discusses several shortcomings and omissions in the
main analysis, and section 7 concludes.
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2 The assassins: terrorists or extortionists?
Consider terrorist groups and their behavior vis-a-vis the state. One party
T threatens to in‡ict some harm on some other party S if party S does not
deliver some more or less precisely articulated favors to party T . In some
cases of terrorist acts, this relationship is perfectly obvious, for instance, if
a terrorist group takes hostages and demands ransom, or an exchange of
the hostages with prisoners of the state, threatening to kill the hostages.
With bombing or assassinations, the case is slightly less straightforward,
as there are no immediate demands tied to the bombing or assassinations.
However, there seems to be a fairly clear understanding as regards what are
the demands of, e.g., the ETA in Spain and France, or the IRA in Northern
Ireland, and in which direction policy had to move in order to comply with
their demands.
The close connection between terrorist threats and extortionary demands
can be studied well with one of the oldest and most successful terrorist groups:
the Assassins or Ismaili. Rapoport (1984), who compares this group with
two other long-lasting ancient terrorist groups, describes this one, who was
active almost for two centuries from 1090 to 1275, as a group that “seriously
threatened the governments of several states, especially those of the Turkish
Seljuk Empire in Persia and Syria.” Their purposes were numerous. They
used their threats to prevent other leaders from conquering their territory,
and to in‡uence other political leaders in religious matters, particularly lead-
ers from the Muslim world. Last, but not least, they used their threats for
extorting tribute from other political leaders of their time. For instance,
the Christian King of Jerusalem is reported to have been a victim of their
extortionary threats (Lewis 1967).
The Assassins’ tools of extortion were simple but e¤ective. Their leader
could rely on a group of well educated and highly skilful young people who
were able to make their way into the sphere of the political leaders of their
time and who were willing to kill the respective leaders in public if the leader
of the assassins orderer them to do so. The public element in terrorist attacks
is important, because it enables the assassins to inform not only the state
that is the actual victim of the attack about the group’s power, but also other
groups which could be extorted from as well. While I concentrate here on the
case where the same state can be extorted from repeatedly, in Konrad and
Skaperdas (1997) we concentrated on the case of many victims, which makes
public observability of actual violence more e¤ective. The recent literature
on terrorism has emphasized the role of the modern mass media for spreading
the information about successful attacks. However, the Assassins’ example
shows that a clever choice of terrorist attacks can achieve a similar publicity
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without modern mass media.2
The Assassins typically found ways to gain access to their targets, and
to become their trusted o¢cers, ministers or servants. What is even more
important, they gained the reputation of being able to attain, or to already
have attained, positions among the intimates of the leader who was the target
of extortion.
The mere existence of the following anecdote reported by Lewis (1967,
p.116n.) illustrates their reputation very well:
Even more startling is a story told by Kamal al-Din on the au-
thority of his brother: ’My brother (God have mercy on him) told
me that Sinan [the Assassin leader at that time] sent a messenger
to Saladin (God have mercy on him) and ordered him to deliver
his message only in private. Saladin had him searched, and when
they found nothing dangerous on him he dismissed the assembly
for him, leaving only a few people, and asked him to deliver his
message. But he said: “My master ordered me not to deliver the
message [unless in private].” Saladin then emptied the assembly
of all save two Mamluks, and then said: ”Give your message.” He
replied: “I have been ordered only to deliver it in private.” Sal-
adin said: “These two do not leave me. If you wish, deliver your
message, and if not, return.” He said: “Why do you not send
away these two as you sent away the others?” Saladin replied:
“I regard these as my own sons, and they and I are as one.”
Then the messenger turned to the two Mamluks and said: “If I
ordered you in the name of my master to kill this Sultan, would
you do so?” They answered yes, and drew their swords, saying:
“Command us as you wish.” Sultan Saladin (God have mercy on
him) was astounded, and the messenger left, taking them with
him. And thereupon Saladin (God have mercy on him) inclined
to make peace with him and enter into friendly relations with
him.’
The case of the Assassins illustrates a number of further relevant aspects of
terrorism. First, terrorism can last a long time. In the case of the Assassins,
the group was active and successful for about 200 years. Second, credibility
2The symbiosis between terrorists and the media has been noted by many researchers
(see, e.g., Slone 2000, and Nelson and Scott 1992). An early policy response has been for-
mulated by Frey (1999), who suggests that the authorities always name several, preferably
con‡icting groups as possibly responsible for the act of terrorism, because this makes an
individual terrorist attack less rewarding for each individual interest group.
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is crucial for its working, and the source of such credibility is investment in
an e¤ective organization combined with visible violent acts of punishment.
As Lewis (1967, p.128) writes,
There were many such sects and groups before the Ismailis
[Assassins], but theirs was the …rst to create an e¤ective and
enduring organization.
Further, Lewis (1967, p.131) writes
There had to be an organization capable both of launching
the attack and surviving the inevitable counter-blow; there had
to be a system of belief – which in that time and place could only
be a religion – to inspire and sustain the attackers to the point
of death.
The example shows that the working of terrorist threats is similar to the
working of extortion, and studying how extortion works may help in un-
derstanding terrorism. I will pursue this goal by addressing the following
questions.
First, how does the terrorist threat work in a static and in a dynamic con-
text? In particular, I will show that repeated threats are the more e¤ective.
Indeed, terrorism is a persistent phenomenon.3
Second, what are the credibility and commitment issues? What are the
relevant information problems?
Third, can the picture that results from such an analysis map the violent
behavior of terrorist groups, the interaction of terrorism and politics, the
slow process of political change, etc.? Violence is a distinctive feature of
terrorism.4
3For instance, The Basque Fatherland and Liberty group (ETA) was founded in 1959
and continues to exist. Similarly, the IRA was formed in 1919 and is the clandestine
armed wing of Sinn Fein, a legal political movement dedicated to removing British forces
from Northern Ireland and unifying Ireland. These con‡icts had considerable economic
cost, but political change can be observed in both the Basque region and Northern Ireland
that is in line with the o¢cial aims of the political branch of the terrorist groups. These
groups are fairly new compared to ancient successful terrorist groups. As reported in
Rapoport (1984), the Thugs existed in India in the seventh century and were still active in
the 13th century; as discussed above, the Assassins were active for almost two centuries
(1090-1275).
4The killing of others, destruction of property, or suicidal terrorist attacks reduce ag-
gregate wealth or welfare and should therefore not occur in a perfect Coasian world. Hence,
it is important to isolate causes for violence from both a positive and a policy oriented
point of view.
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Fourth, an analysis needs to clarify the role of retaliation. Is retalia-
tion and destruction of the terrorist network in the interest of the victim of
extortion, and does it increase welfare?
3 Basic aspects of extortion
The analysis starts with a simple static benchmark structure of extortion
that is a variant of the structure analysed in Konrad and Skaperdas (1997,
1998a).
3.1 The full information one-period benchmark case
Suppose there are two parties, T(errorist) and S(tate) involved in a game that
is described as follows. In stage 1 player T chooses whether to invest or not
to invest in building up a network or an organization that allows T to carry
out damaging acts to player S with zero further cost. The investment cost
required for this punishment strategy is e. That is, T chooses its investment
expenditure from the set f0; eg. In stage 2 player T approaches player S
and demands a particular favor that bene…ts T by x if player S complies.
The size of x is exogenously determined and not a matter of T ’s choice. In
stage 3 player S decides whether to comply or not. If S complies, S has a
cost of C(x), and the game ends. If S does not comply, then, in stage 4,
player T carries out a terrorist attack, if and only if, T has invested in stage
1 in building up an appropriate organization for carrying out the punishment
at zero cost. If the punishment is carried out, it causes damage to player S
equal to D > C(x). It is straightforward to observe the following
Proposition 1 In the full information one period benchmark case, invest-
ment and successful extortion takes place in the equilibrium if, and only if,
x > e and D > C(x).
The relationship between terrorists and states is complicated by a number
of unobservability problems. For instance, the state, or the politician, or
party who grants some rights knows the true size of this sacri…ce, C(x), or
the actual cost incured in the terrorist act, but the terrorist typically does not.
How big is the sacri…ce for those who do not want to give in to IRA demands?
What are the costs for Spain and for the Spanish government of granting more
autonomy to the Basque region? Given that T has developed some credible
extortionary threat, it may be able to choose its demand x and thus impose a
straightforward rent extraction problem. If there is only one extortion period,
as in the benchmark structure, and if T expects that the costs of compliance
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are distributed according to some given distribution function, the solution is a
straightforward maximization problem as discussed in Konrad and Skaperdas
(1998a). With several extortion periods, the problem becomes more involved
and player T faces a ratchet problem (see Konrad and Skaperdas 1998b).
This ratchet problem may explain why extortionary threats lead not to major
policy jumps, but to gradual adjustment processes. The ratchet problem
may also explain if the state appears extremely restrictive with respect to
the terrorists’ demands initially, but may make concessions over time.
Second, the terrorist group must make an investment choice knowing that
the government cannot observe this choice. The government must form an
opinion about whether a terrorist group is forceful and long-lived or not. In
line with Konrad and Skaperdas (1997), I will take the decision to form and
maintain a terrorist network as endogenous. The terrorist group chooses its
ability to carry out an act of punishment at no further cost, but the state
cannot observe this choice, and the actual choice can be revealed only in the
event of a punishment act.5
3.2 Unobserved investment - the choice of one’s type
Suppose that, unlike the benchmark case, T ’s investment choice in stage 1
is unobserved by S. Then S must have some expectation about whether T
has made the investment. In this case it becomes a dominant strategy for T
not to invest, regardless of how small (but positive) the investment cost e is,
and this makes it optimal for S not to comply with any demand made by T .
This can be stated as
Proposition 2 Extortion breaks down in the one-period context if the in-
vestment choice is unobservable.
However, repeated interaction, even if …nite, can make the extortion equi-
librium re-emerge. Konrad and Skaperdas (1997) have shown this in a con-
text in which a sequence of victims is approached by the extortionist, where
the victims that are approached later observe whether the victims that were
approached earlier complied or not, and whether they were punished in case
of non-compliance. Here I consider the intertemporal problem in which a
terrorist can extort from a state in successive periods. That is, period 0 is
5As mentioned in the introduction, Lapan and Sandler (1993) discuss whether and
how terrorists can signal their true strength – de…ned as their exogenously given resource
endowment– by using some of these resources in a deliberate terrorist attack, and Scott
(1991, 1993) considers reputation mechanisms on the side of the government in line with
Kreps and Wilson (1982).
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as described in the one-period game, but there are future periods t = 1; ::: in
each of which the stages 2 to 4 repeat.
The intuition can be made clear where there are two periods in which
extortion can take place, where, for simplicity, I disregard any discounting,
and assume that the investment can take place only at the beginning of period
0. These two assumptions will be relaxed later on. The reason why the no
extortion result breaks down is as follows. In a no extortion equilibrium the
payo¤ for T is zero. If T deviates from the no-extortion equilibrium and
invests, the payo¤ is at least equal to ¡e+ x. To see this, notice that S will
comply in one period at least as non-compliance in both periods is not time
consistent. If S does not comply in period 1, it is punished, and, from then
on, knows that T has invested and is ready to again punish non-compliance
in period 2. Therefore, if S does not comply in period 1 it complies in
period 2. In any period which follows a period in which S had refused to
comply, S has learned whether T can and will punish; hence, S complies if
T had invested, and refuses to comply if T had not invested. The following
proposition characterizes the 2-period equilibrium.
Proposition 3 Let x > e and D > C(x). A perfect equilibrium in a two-
period set-up with unobserved investment is characterized by a probability q0
with
q0 =
2C(x)
C(x) +D
(1)
by which T invests, a probability p0 with
p0 =
e
x
, (2)
by which S refuses to comply in period 0 and where S refuses to comply in
period 1 if, and only if, it refused to comply in period 0 and was not punished.
For a proof consider the investment probability that makes S indi¤erent
whether to comply or not in period 0. The costs of compliance are 2C(x).
The expected costs of non-compliance are q0(D+C(x)). Equating these terms
and solving for q0 yields (1). Note that this q0 is su¢ciently high to make
S strictly prefer to comply in period 1 if it has complied in period 0, as the
indi¤erence probability for compliance in period 1 is simply equal to C(x)=D
and is smaller than (1). Now consider p0 that makes the terrorist indi¤erent
between investing in period 0 or not. T ’s expected payo¤ from not investing
is (1 ¡ p0)2x. The expected payo¤ from investing is ¡e + (1¡ p0)2x + p0x.
Investment reduces the payo¤ by the investment cost, but pays an additional
x with a probability of p0 because with this probability S refuses to comply
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in period 0. In this case T receives zero when no investment occurred, and
T receives zero in period 0 and x in period 1 if T has invested. ¤
According to Proposition 3, S refuses to comply with higher probability
if the investment cost e is higher, or if x is lower. The result for repeated
extortion has three features that map terrorism in the real world. First, if
terrorist groups show up they are typically long-lived. The result here shows
that repeated interaction is needed for terrorism to emerge, but (even …nite)
repeated interaction can solve a credibility problem in the extortion game.
Second, the result also shows that violence is an equilibrium phenomenon.
It is needed in order to reveal the terrorists’ ability to carry out harmful
acts. Third, the result shows that an actual terrorist act is valuable for the
terrorist group. Apart from the self-con…dence which is outside the scope of
this paper, it reveals that the group’s threat is credible and this is valuable.
For instance, in the two-period game above, full information from the very
beginning increases T ’s payo¤ from (2x ¡ 2e) to 2x ¡ e; whereas the payo¤
of S in both types of equilibrium is equal to ¡2C(x).
The problem at hand straightforwardly generalizes to N > 2 extortion
periods. However, with many periods, the assumption that the opportunity
to build up an organization occurs once and for ever becomes less plausible,
and discounting becomes a more important issue. An issue I will address
…rst, however, is the choice of the terrorist’s demands.
3.3 Endogenizing the demands
So far, the demand x of the terrrorist group has been considered exogenous,
and constant over time. This may, but need not, be the case. In the context
of T ’s observability problems, the endogeneity of x involves serious compli-
cations.
Consider period 1. If T was challenged in period 0, the outcome is clear:
there will be non-compliance if it turned out that T was unable to punish,
and there will be compliance up to a demand x^ with C(x^) = D if T proved
to be able and willing to punish in period 0. This reveals that a terrorist
group, which has indeed a functioning organization, bene…ts from having the
opportunity to carry out a punishment action.
If T has not been challenged in period 0, things are more complicated.
No new information has been revealed. There will be many equilibria. Any
demand x1 2 [0; C¡1(D)] can be an equilibrium. This can be seen as follows.
Suppose thatS thinks that a terrorist who makes a demand other than x1 has
not invested for sure, and refuses any such demand x 6= x1. It may comply
with x1, however, if x1 is not too high. Given these beliefs, the terrorist will
never ask for any amount other than x1 in the last period, because he will not
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receive anything from making any demand di¤erent from x1. Accordingly,
x1 is not well determined. But this is not only a last-period problem. More
generally, if x is endogenous, it is possible to support many equilibria through
S ’s beliefs about T ’s investment decision as a function of T ’s demands.
In Konrad and Skaperdas (1997) we discuss this issue and assume that
x is chosen before the terrorist group makes the investment choice, so that
the terrorist group’s demands cannot be considered as a signal of the gang’s
actual demands. In this case we found that, from an ex-ante point of view,
the terrorist group prefers to choose the highest possible demand that still
leads to an equilibrium of the above type.
3.4 In…nite time horizon
Introducing a discount rate, the above analysis can be extended to the case
with an in…nite number of periods, with the investment in a terrorist network,
extortion demands, terrorist attack etc. in each period. The di¤erence from
the former set-up in this extension is the idea that the terrorist group could
invest at a later period if it has not invested earlier, particularly if this became
observable because no terrorist attack followed non-compliance.
The game structure becomes as illustrated in …gure 1. In period 0 in
stage 1 the gang decides whether to invest and spend e on creating a network
or organization, or to invest zero. The investment probability in period 0 will
be denoted q0. As in the …nite horizon case, this investment establishes a
punishment mechanism by which the terrorist carries out acts of punishment
at zero further cost if (and only if) the state did not comply. Next, in
stage 2, the terrorist group asks for a political favor. This favor is valued
at x by the terrorist group and its size is exogenous, and the state’s cost of
granting this favor in the respective period is C(x). Next, in stage 3, the
government decides whether to comply or to refuse to comply. Let p0 denote
the probability with which the government decides to refuse to comply in
period 0. In stage 4, if the government refuses to comply, the terrorist
network will carry out a terrorist attack if, and only if, it is able to carry
out such an attack, i.e., if it has invested in building up an organization. It
simpli…es the exposition (and possibly eliminates a few additional equilibria)
to assume that the terrorist attack is triggered by a refusal to comply, instead
of making this a matter of choice. The damage that is in‡icted to the state
if the act of punishment occurs is again denoted D. Accordingly, if this
happens, the gang’s investment becomes revealed and the government will
comply in all future periods. If T has not invested in period 0; this also
becomes observable at this stage. No damage is in‡icted on S in this period.
From here, the game starts from the beginning again in the sense that T can
10
decide again about whether to invest in a terrorist organization or not at the
begining of period 1.
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(1 ¡ p0)0 Comply
(1 ¡ p0)e Comply
q0
(1 ¡ q0)
p0
p0
Comply
Comply
Comply
Not comply,
inducing the
terrorist attack.
Terrorist
group
decides
whether
to invest.
State
decides
whether
to comply.
Not comply,
no attack.
The investment
problem
reappears.
New investment opportunity.
Situation repeats.
Equilibrium payo¤s
¡ for the terrorist
© for the state
Period 0 Period 1 Period 2
Figure 1: The in…nitely repeated game
Consider next what happens if the state decides to comply in period 0. In
this case no attack occurs. Further, it may be reasonable to assume that
compliance is an irreversible decision, or to select a particular equilibrium
path for the continuation games in which the government complied in a
period t and assume that the state will comply for all future periods.
Solving for the equilibria of this game, denote ¡ the equilibrium payo¤ of
the terrorist group, and © the equilibrium payo¤ of the state, and let 1
1+r
be
the discount factor both for the terrorist group and for the state. Then, in
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order to be indi¤erent between investing and not investing, it must hold in
period 0 that
¡e+ (1¡ p0)xr + p0
1
1 + r
x
r
= ¡ = (1¡ p0)xr + p0
1
1 + r
¡. (3)
The left-hand side of (3) is the terrorist group’s payo¤ from investing. It
has to bear the investment cost e, and, with probability (1 ¡ p0); it receives
an annuity of size x which has a present value equal to x=r, whereas, with
probability p0, the state refuses to comply in period 0, and this triggers
the terrorist attack and reveals to the state that the terrorist group has
invested. Accordingly, the state will comply for all future periods from period
1 onwards. The right-hand side of (3) is the present value from not investing
in period 0. In this case there is also a probability (1¡p0) by which the state
complies, leading to a ‡ow of bene…ts with a present value equal to x=r.
With the remaining probability p0, the state does not comply. No attack
occurs. It becomes observable that it has not invested in the organization
that is required to carry out the terrorist threat. At this point, the situation is
similar to the one in period 0 and the terrorist group may reconsider whether
or not to invest, and it should be able to generate the same equilibrium payo¤
from the extortion game starting one period later.
The conditions (3) yield an equilibrium value of p0 (and similarly for all
periods in which the government gets a …rst chance to refuse to comply with
the terrorist group’s demands) equal to
p0 =
1
2x
³
¡e +
p
(e2 +4xe)
´
(1 + r) (4)
The terrorists’ advantage of having invested in a given period in which the
government decides not to comply with the terrorist group’s demands be-
comes smaller in this set-up than if the investment choice is a unique op-
portunity as in the previous set-up. Instead of establishing the reputation
of being able to carry out a terrorist attack, the terrorist group can simply
start establishing this reputation one period later by investing a period later.
The state is indi¤erent to whether to comply or to refuse compliance if
T ’s probability for having invested ful…lls the following condition:
C
r
=
1
1 + r
C
r
+ q0D
This makes use of the consideration that, in the period after non-compliance,
whatever the outcome is the government will again be in a situation of in-
di¤erence between compliance and non-compliance, and assumes that the
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government will simply comply in this later period. The condition simpli…es
to
q0 =
1
(1 + r)
C
D
. (5)
Accordingly, the fact that the terrorist group has a repeated chance for in-
vestment does not change the equilibrium probability for investing in a given
period, as this reduces to q = C=D for r = 0. I summarize this result as
Proposition 4 If investment is unobservable and the terrorist group has
a new investment opportunity in each period, the perfect equilibrium with
in…nite time horizon and discount rate 1
1+r
is given by (5) and (4) if the
investment cost e > 0 is su¢ciently small.
In the long run, the probability that the terrorist group has made an
investment in period t increases, and, converges towards 1 if t approaches
in…nity. Accordingly, if terrorists get a repeated opportunity to invest in
establishing a network, eventually they will do this and eventually they will
be successful with their agenda and make the government comply. This
last result should not be taken too seriously because it is not robust and
is caused by the assumption that T ’s investment lasts for ever and that a
terrorist group never prefers to exit.
4 Retaliation
In the contexts considered above, non-compliance with the terrorist network’s
demands may, but need not, trigger a terrorist attack. The attack occurs if
the terrorist network has the capability for carrying out the attack. If the
terrorist group successfully attacks, this changes the prior beliefs regarding
the terrorist group’s investment choice. If the attack is successful, the state
will fully comply with the terrorists’ demands. This result explains why
the government may dislike successful attacks (apart from the damage they
cause) and why the terrorist group enjoys and celebrates successful attacks:
they establish the terrorists’ reputation.
However, this result rests on a strong assumption. The ability to carry out
attacks does not depreciate. The state may try to destroy a terrorist group’s
network and its ability to carry out successful attacks. Indeed, an empiri-
cally relevant aspect of terrorism is that the state intensi…es its antiterrorist
e¤ort when a terrorist attack has taken place and tries to retaliate. In the
framework considered here, this retaliation could be seen as an attempt to
destroy the terrorists’ network and its ability to carry out future attacks, for
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instance, because the terrorist group could increase its demands given that it
has successfully established its ability to carry out attacks. After retaliation
and destruction, it is then up to the terrorist group to consider whether to
invest from the beginning, or to abstain from investment.
The ability to destroy the network, together with an ex ante commitment
to destroy the terrorists’ group’s investment each time a successful attack has
been launched, destroys the value of the information being revealed about
the ability to attack successfully. The bene…t of having invested compared
to not having invested is that the state which refused to comply will comply
if the terrorist gang has successfully proven its power, and may continue
to refuse to comply if the terrorist group did not successfully attack. This
bene…t accrues not in the period in which refusal and attack took place, but
in later periods and is based on the change in the state’s perceptions about
the terrorist group’s choices. If the state manages to commit to destroying
the investment once the investment has been revealed, the future bene…t of
investment can never materialize. This then implies that no investment ever
takes place.
Note that this argument is independent of whether the terrorist group
has the ability to reinvest in each period or not: it will not invest in the
last period. It will also not invest in the second last period: an investment
in this period could generate bene…ts only in the last period, and only if
the government refused to comply and the gang attacked successfully, thus
proving its abilities. But the destruction of the investment, particularly in
this state, will eliminate this bene…t. This argument continues up to the …rst
period.
Also, for this argument to apply, it is not necessary to assume that the
probability of success in retaliating and destroying the terrorist network, or
the probability by which retaliation occurs, must be equal to 1. It is su¢cient
to assume that these probabilities are su¢ciently high to induce the state to
not comply next period. The following proposition summarizes this result.
Proposition 5 If the state has a technology that can destroy the terrorist
organization and can commit to use this technology as a reaction to an attack
with su¢ciently high probability, with endogenous unobserved investment by
the terrorist this leads to an equilibrium without terrorism.
5 Making the extortion game unpro…table
Consider the welfare implications of terrorism and possible policy options.
First, in the extortion equilibrium above, the government is typically indi¤er-
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ent between compliance and non-compliance, or even strictly prefers compli-
ance. Hence, it cannot gain from …ghting terrorism. This is an unfortunate
outcome and suggests that the only way out is to break this equilibrium. The
analysis suggests several variables that can be in‡uenced in order to achieve
this goal.
First, the government can change the cost of compliance. A su¢cient
increase in compliance cost will make the mixed strategy equilibirum disap-
pear. The structure of governance in a state may in‡uence the compliance
cost. If the head of state is known to have compliance cost that exceeds his
or her cost of su¤ering a terrorist attack, this should lead to an extortion free
equilibrium. Similarly, if the state’s decision maker does not bear the cost of
the terrorist attack, but su¤ers from the compliance cost, this will also lead
to an extortion free outcome. Such structures are di¢cult to generate, how-
ever, particularly within given democratic institutions. Moreover, for this
policy to work, it is essential that the extortion equilibrium fully disappears.
As long as the mixed strategy equilibrium persists, the utility loss on the
side of the state is independent of the particular equilibrium probabilities for
investment and compliance.
Second, the mixed strategy equilibrium disappears if the cost of invest-
ing in a network become su¢ciently high. There are two principal ways of
changing these costs. One is to make attack more di¢cult, spend more re-
sources on surveillance, tighten security control etc. To make such a policy
su¢ciently e¤ective would mean a drastic change of our world, and imply a
major sacri…ce. The other means is to increase the terrorist’s opportunity
cost of investment. This may be the more viable way to go, even though it
has its disadvantages and limits, too.
Third, as pointed out in section 4, commitment to su¢ciently strong
retaliation eliminates the terrorist group’s incentives for investment. This
conclusion, however, has to be considered with some caution. Retaliation
may have side e¤ects that are not considered in this simple extortion frame-
work. For instance, retaliation may change (and actually lower) the terrorist
group’s future cost of investing in an organization if it makes it easier to
recruit new members etc. So, while commitment to retaliate turns out to
be a useful tool in the pure extortion framework, implementation should not
occur without carefully considering these side e¤ects. Some of these e¤ects
are discussed in the next section.
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6 Important neglected aspects
The analysis here abstracts from many aspects that are important, and pos-
sibly crucial, in describing terrorism, and some of these aspects should be
mentioned here more explicitly.
First, the terrorist organization operates within a larger and heterogenous
society. Feelings of subgroups of this society towards the terrorist group mat-
ter.6 The feelings of the population in Arab countries towards the terrorist
organization and the states that were attacked, and which now intervene in
the Arab region are an important factor and this aspect is absent in the con-
siderations here. Also, attack and retaliation may cause new terrorist groups
to emerge or change existing groups or the balance of power between them.
Second, I considered the state as a perfect agent on behalf of a homoge-
nous population that does not include the terrorists. The state is neither a
perfect agent, nor is the population homogenous, particularly in many re-
gions where terrorist groups are active. Tensions between the government
and some of the population in a country are important for the functioning of
the terrorist threat. This is most obvious in situations in which a large share
of the population sympathizes with the terrorist group, which may be the
case more frequently in dictatorial states. Another aspect of this is the trend
of giving up civil liberty rights under the terrorist threat. While it is not
perfectly clear what the policy failure is, the loosening of privacy laws and
the willingness to give up important human rights, even when these changes
do not have an impact on the terrorist organizations and their operations, is
puzzling.7 It seems to be easy for governments to convince their citizens that
6 I am not engaging in a study of whether, and under what circumstances, terror-
ism is considered a legitimate tool of politics, or how this depends on social or po-
litical factors and the correlation between own value judgements and terrorists’ goals.
There seems to be evidence that acts of terrorism are considered more or less le-
gitimate, depending on the perceived goals, and the avaliability of alternative means
to achieve these goals. To mention an example, in the recent Harris poll (see,
http://www.contrast.org/mirrors/ehj/html/harris_poll.html) 89 percent of the respon-
dents answered that killing people is sometimes justi…ed when asked the question ”During
World War II, a group of German o¢cers set up a bomb to kill Hitler and nearly did so.
Do you think that there are sometimes situations like this where it is morally justi…ed to
kill people if you have no other way to …ght against a really bad government or leader?”
57 percent of respondents considered people …ghting to overthrow undemocratic govern-
ments as freedom …ghers rather than terrorists, and 58 percent of respondents answered
that bombs can be justi…ed when asked the question “Some terrorists or freedom …ghters
groups are …ghting against governments that do not give their people the right to decide
their own future by free democratic elections. Do you think that the use of bombs and
guns against these governments can ever be justi…ed?”
7Frey (1999) has also expressed concerns about the large willingness to sacri…ce human
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more surveillance and less privacy is an appropriate response to a terrorist
attack.8 Maybe a better understanding is needed of why privacy laws can
improve welfare in a world in which the government is not a perfect agent on
behalf of the citizens.9
Third, I do not consider the internal structure and organization of ter-
rorist groups. As in the case of the maÞa, this is an underresearched area,
but for obvious reasons. On the other hand, to understand the emergence
and formation of such groups and the astounding stability of the groups is
important. Such organizational questions should be high on the research
agenda.10
Fourth, I abstract from the fact that the government of the state that
is the victim of the terrorist threat is a complex organization. Indeed, the
organizational structure matters for whether a state can be extorted by a
terrorist threat, or not. Returning to the Ismaili case study, Lewis (1967) re-
ports evidence that the Ismaili successfully extorted from the Christian King
of Jerusalem. However, they were less successful with the Hospitallers and
the Templars, which were organizations of knights who were, to some extent,
subordinates of the King of Jerusalem.11 Not only did the Hospitallers and
Templars refuse to pay tribute to the Ismaili, but the Ismaili were actually
extorted from by the Templars. This diﬀerence is often attributed to the
diﬀerent types of government structure. According to Lewis (1967, p.121),
This tribute was paid, explains Joinville, because these two
orders feared nothing from the Assassins, since, if one master
was killed, he would at once be replaced by another as good and
rights under the threat of terrorism. For the recent development in the US see Rathbone
and Rowley (2002, p.17).
8There are examples for this in many countries. The U.S. is about to, or has taken
already, measures as a reaction to September 11, 2001. In Germany, the terrorist group
Rote Armee Fraktion caused a tightening of security laws, police and prosecution rights,
and a reduction in privacy rights. Several other laws have been enacted recently that follow
a similar pattern.
9A step in this direction is made in Konrad (2001) where I show that government
failure of a welfarist government may be reduced by an information asymmetry between
the government and private individuals.
10It is unclear whether the internal coherence and the functioning of the chain of com-
mand inside such organisations can be explained on purely economic grounds. The Ismaili
may have carefully instilled the actual assassins with certain preferences and beliefs about
the post mortem state. It is most likely that there are also sanctions that make it costly for
a group member to defect. As has been discussed in the context of the MaÞa (Polo 1995),
the understanding of the internal structure and incentive mechanisms of such organizations
is important for understanding, and possibly for undermining, these organizations.
11The precise relationship is more complicated. Their main superior was the Pope, and
the degree of autonomy was considerable. See, e.g., Selwood (1999) for some details.
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the Assassin chief did not wish to waste his men where nothing
could be gained.
Whether or not this can really explain the diﬀerence, is unclear. One may
think that the considerations of the head of the Templars or of the Hospi-
tallers and their willingness to pay to avoid a credible threat of being assassi-
nated are not much diﬀerent from those of a king, and it is unclear why their
lower transaction cost of Þnding a successor should help. A diﬀerent, and
perhaps more convincing reason for the diﬀerence may result from the larger
discretion the king has to allocate his wealth, compared to that of the head
of the Hospitallers or Templars. The case reveals that organizational design
matters for whether an organization is immune to extortionary threats or
not, and this opens up an important question for future research.
Fifth, I make only a small step in putting terrorism into a wider perspec-
tive here. To invest and build up a terrorist organization must be seen as
a matter of choice. On the individual scale, the trade-oﬀ between legal and
illegal activities has been considered in the literature on crime and punish-
ment, and an application of this in the context of hijackers is Landes (1978).
However, the question of whether it is worthwhile to make the investment
to form a complex organization has several more dimensions. Attitudes of
groups in society matter, and attitudes towards, for instance, politically mo-
tivated assassination are most likely to depend on the political, economic and
social situation, on the amount of oppression from others, and on the alterna-
tive options that certain groups in the society can exercise. When collectives
are involved, expectations about co-players attitudes and the likelihood of
contagion also matter.
7 Conclusions
In this paper I used an early terrorist group to show that there is no clear
cut distinction between extortion and terrorism. The group was a state and
a non-state organization during diﬀerent periods of its existence and used
terrorism as an instrument to pursue political, religious and monetary goals.
I used this structural similarity to draw some conclusions from the theory
of extortion for a theory of terrorism, concentrating on a fundamental infor-
mation problem. This information problem can explain why terrorism is a
multi-period problem, why violence occurs, why terrorists prefer publicity,
and how retaliation can, but need not, aﬀect the equilibrium outcome in a
beneÞcial way. I also discuss brießy the various determinants that cause a dis-
tinction between equilibria without terrorism and equilibria with terrorism,
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and which determinants can more easily be inßuenced by political action.
It should be emphasized, however, that the analysis of extortion abstracts
from many aspects that are important, and possibly crucial, in describing
terrorism, some of which may had to diﬀerent policy conclusions.
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